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The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of expert witness testimony on juror 
verdicts.  We, further, assessed whether there would be a difference in the relative influence of 
MDs and PhD expert witnesses.  Undergraduate and graduate students served as mock jurors and 
were presented with an insanity case which either (a) a PhD testified for the defense and a MD 
testified for the prosecution or (b) an MD testified for the defense and a PhD testified for the 
prosecution.  After analysis of verdicts, an “Insanity Defense Attitudes Survey,” and specific 
witness credibility evaluations indicated no bias toward MD’s, except for the PhD-defense/MD-
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 The history of expert witness testimony in criminal trials dates back to the 
eighteenth century.  Expert testimony is a staple in a wide variety of trials including, but 
not limited to, business and toxic torts, contracts, intellectual property and anti-trust 
cases.  Although experts can testify in any case in which their expertise is relevant, 
mental health professionals are more likely used in criminal cases.  In times past, the 
practice of the mental health professional as expert witness is one that had been 
dominated by psychiatrists.  This is due in part to the fact that the legal field has 
historically favored medically trained persons
1
 as expert witnesses.  Psychiatrists 
subscribe to a medical model of mental illness, which explains mental disorder as being 
physical diseases that are treatable by medications.  This is different from the approach of 
many other mental health professionals that subscribe to models that are more holistic.  
Trial court judges have the authority to exercise their own discretion in 
determining which members of the mental health profession might be admitted as expert 
witnesses.  Generally, case law supported the domination of “medical” experts in cases 
involving complex psychological issues until the 1940 Michigan Supreme Court case of 
People v. Hawthorne (Polythress, 1983).   Even some areas of the field of psychology 
itself presented some biases.  A 1954 resolution adopted by the American Medical 
Association, the Council of the American Psychiatric Association and the Executive 
Council of the American Psychoanalytic asserted that “physicians” were the lone 
legitimate experts in the field of mental illness or disease (Greenburg & Wursten, 1988).   
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Polythress (1983) chronicles the early shift from the medical psychological 
witness as the preferred witness.  He cites People v. Hawthorne (1940), which set in 
motion a push back against the restriction of nonmedical testimony regarding 
psychological issues.  Judge Butzel issued this opinion in the case: “There is no magic in 
particular titles or degrees.”  Jenkins v. United States (1962) ruled that a lack of a medical 
degree would not automatically bar a psychologist from testifying on the mental state of 
an individual.  It, also, reaffirmed the importance of “demonstrable training and practical 
experience in the areas of diagnosing and treating psychopathology over simple 
possession of certain titles or degrees (p.3).”  
Case specificity of expert witness testimony can be conceptualized as a 
continuum ranging from purely educative to conclusively evaluative.  Mental health 
professionals are often called upon to testify in legal proceedings as “fact” witnesses or as 
“expert” witnesses.  As fact witnesses, they are treated as other witnesses and may be 
asked to provide information from their practice (e.g. what treatment they gave, who said 
what).  On the other hand, an expert witness is an individual with special knowledge 
likely to be helpful in court.  They may testify to matters of their special learning or 
knowledge.   In recent years, psychologists have contributed theoretical and empirical 
evidence to address seemingly common sense understanding of legal procedures.  For 
example, the fact that eyewitnesses could be wrong or that traumatic memories may be 
fabricated is a factor that the average juror may not apply to the processing of evidence 
they receive during a trial.  Yet, psychological research has established both the 
theoretical and empirical foundations for these assertions.  In addition, the expert witness 
may, also, testify to matters of opinion.  The expert witness is expected to yield testimony 
3 
 
that will shed light on a subject matter that is outside common experience or scope of 
knowledge of the average juror.  It is to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue (Fed. R. Evid. 702, 1975).” 
Jurors are frequently reluctant to render guilty verdicts in the absence of hard 
facts.  For example, prosecutors have had a difficult time obtaining convictions in rape 
cases, despite bringing their strongest cases.  The issue in rape cases often becomes one 
of his words against hers.  The average person, like the average juror, may have 
numerous myths, stereotypes and misconceptions about the phenomenon of rape that may 
adversely affect the perceptions of the victim‟s credibility in court.  Although research 
indicates that in about 40% of all rapes, the victim is at least casually acquainted with her 
assailant, it is commonly believed that “true” rape involves strangers (Brekke & Borgida, 
1988).  Expert witness testimony about this research may greatly affect the juror‟s 
perception of the case.   
In a study conducted by Loftus (1980), the influence of expert witness testimony 
about eyewitness identification on jury verdicts in both violent and nonviolent cases were 
assessed.  Half of the jurors read about the testimony of a defense expert on the reliability 
of eyewitness identification, and half did not.  The results indicated there was an increase 
in the amount of attention that jurors gave to eyewitness accounts when psychological 
expert testimony was present. 
Blackman and Brickman (1984) explored the various aspects of the use and 
impact of expert testimony in cases of battered women who kill.  When an expert witness 
testifies during the trial of a battered woman who has killed her husband, she or he is 
regularly engaged in a process of re-education.  Experts who testify about battered 
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women‟s experiences are addressing jurors who possess ideas and experiences about 
conflict within family relationships and traditional sex roles in family life.  These 
commonly held beliefs, however, may not necessarily be accurate and often reflect myths 
and stereotypes about battered women.  Expert testimony by social psychologists attempt 
to refine and advance current beliefs. 
The complexity of legal litigation can present conflict for juror decision making 
capabilities. Juries face a difficult and complex task of comprehending the evidence 
presented. Trial complexity has even led some legal scholars and judges to question 
whether there are cases so complex that juries cannot render verdicts fairly based upon a 
rational evaluation of the evidence.  (Cooper, Bennet & Sukel, 1996).   
There is cause for concern about the comprehension of the average juror for two 
reasons.  First, jurors may be overwhelmed by the volume of evidence that is presented 
during a trial.  Additionally, there are judicial instructions given in a case.  There may 
also be several expert witnesses for one case.  Second, the average juror is not adept in 
understanding legal concepts.  Most jurors do not follow instructions on the law given by 
the judge in a case.  The information is often presented using legal terms and jargon.  
Most jurors cannot remember the information given, much less interpret.   
Scientific evidence in cases is, also, often presented in technically complex 
language.   Cooper, Bennet & Sukel (1996) demonstrate when scientific evidence is 
presented in technically complex language, simulated jurors are more persuaded by a 
witness with more impressive credentials.  Research seems to indicate that jurors look to 
other factors of the expert to determine whether they feel what he or she has to say is 
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credible; and, therefore what they say should be applied to the juror‟s comprehension of 
the case. 
Horowitz, Bordens, Victor, Bourgeois and ForsterLee (2001) conducted a study 
where one hundred twenty mock jurors heard one of several versions of a civil trial on 
audiotape.  The tort trial was either high or low in information load and contained 
evidence that either clearly favored the plaintiffs or was ambiguous.  The expert witness 
was a medical doctor and testified in either technical or less technical language.  Results 
show high information loads and technical language hindered evidence processing.  The 
verdicts favored plaintiffs when the evidence was clear and presented in technical 
language because technical language enhanced witnesses‟ credibility when the evidence 
was clear.   This finding would suggest that there are certain characteristics of the expert 
witness and not the testimony alone that affects the juror decision-making. 
Perlin (1977) asserts although clinical psychologists may be gaining equality with 
psychiatrists as expert witnesses, it is only in terms of “legal status” and that psychiatrists 
may continue to have a higher “social status” in the courtroom.  The perception of judges 
may have changed enough to allow technical admissibility of a nonmedical expert 
witness to take the stand, but if the bias is also, social, the effect on jurors must also be 
considered.   According to Berlo, Lemmert & Mertz (1970), credibility is enhanced when 
the communicator holds a position of high status.   
Two studies have actually compared psychologists and psychiatrists in a legal 
context.  They report paradoxical findings.  Polythress (1983) found that among trial 
judges, there was still a medical bias in attitudes.  In the study, trial judges were surveyed 
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony of members of several professional 
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groups on a wide range of issues that arise in criminal justice proceedings.  The results 
revealed there was some evidence of preference for testimony by medical experts.  
Psychiatrists received the highest ratings on six of eight legal issues.  Conversely, 
Swenson, Nash and Roos (1984), in a simulated child-custody case, found that 
psychologists and social workers were perceived as more credible than psychiatrists. The 
latter result may have occurred because the area of dispute is one in which psychologists 
and social workers have historically established expertise.  
A large body of research in social cognition indicates that attitudes can strongly 
bias the information processing sequence.  Jurors‟ attitudes have strong influences on 
their decision-making and case judgments.  Juror attitudes can even affect cognitive 
function ranging from attention to memory (Louden & Skeem, 2007).  Juror attitudes 
often override the application of legal standards in cases.  In insanity defense cases, for 
example, jurors are tasked with applying the appropriate legal standard of insanity to the 
evidence presented at trial to reach a verdict.  Insanity defense cases are perfect examples 
of instances where many jurors often ignore legal instructions and personal convictions 
and/or preference may have some bearing on their verdicts.  Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw and 
Koch (1985) tested real jurors and found that their attitudes toward the insanity defense 
predicted verdicts.  Specifically, negative attitudes towards the insanity defense strongly 
predicted verdicts of “guilty.”  Finkel et. al found these findings to be consistent with the 
“vast amount” of research that has established, attitudes toward the insanity defense exert 
considerable influence on mock jurors‟ verdicts in insanity cases.   
The issue of criminal insanity is one of the best examples of the differing 
approaches of psychology and law and the tension that exists as a result.  When a 
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defendant asserts the affirmative defense of insanity they are examined by a mental 
health psychiatrist or psychologist.  The first step for any psychiatrist/psychologist is to 
diagnose the defendant with some form of mental disorder.  Once that step is completed, 
the psychiatrist/psychologist must determine how severe the defendant‟s functional 
impairment is (or the severity of the mental disorder).  The psychiatrist must then make 
inferences as to whether the defendant has the capacity for judgment.  In essence, the 
legal system uses the mental health system to answer the question of whether an 
individual is sane or not (insanity).  This question, however, is not easily answered 
because the law and psychology define insanity differently. 
In order for a person to be convicted of a crime, it must be proven that, along with 
the conscious act, there was intent or mens rea.  The defense of insanity is often used by 
an individual accused of a crime to negate mens rea.  There are currently two major legal 
standards of insanity used in the United States.  The most notable is the McNaughton 
rule, which excuses criminal conduct if the defendant 1) did not know what he or she was 
doing or 2) did not know what he or she was doing was wrong.  One of the major 
criticisms of the McNaughten rule is that, in its focus on the cognitive ability to know 
right from wrong, it fails to take into consideration the issue of control or "irresistible 
impulse".  Psychiatrists agree that it is possible to understand that one's behavior is 
wrong, but still be unable to stop oneself.  
 Approximately half of the states in the United States currently use the Brawner 
rule as the legal standard of insanity.  The Brawner rule states that the defendant is not 
responsible for his or her criminal behavior if he or she lacks substantial capacity to 
either appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his 
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or her conduct to the requirements of law (Butler, 2006).  The law is interested in whether 
the defendant knew right from wrong at the moment of the alleged wrongdoing.  Even if 
a person is diagnosed with a specific mental disorder, the defense would have to prove 
that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness at the time of 
the criminal act, in order to please Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI).  NGRI is 
also referred to as the insanity defense. 
Are people who suffer from mental illness capable of appreciating the difference 
between right and wrong?  The case of Andrea Yates, a Texas mother known for killing 
her five young children on June 20, 2001 is a recent case that explores this question.  It 
was reported that she suffered for years with postpartum depression and psychosis.  The 
McNaughten Rule was used in her case and she was initially convicted of capital murder.  
Her conviction was later overturned on appeal and a jury ruled Yates was Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity (Resnick, 2007).   
Andrea Yates had called the police after she killed her children and admitted that 
she had done something wrong.  This matters a lot to legal conceptions of insanity, and 
may have influenced the initial verdict, but it matters little to psychology.  Psychology 
views psychotic behaviors as outward manifestations of a disease process that impairs 
rational thinking.  In other words, mental illness is not something that can be turned on 
and off.  It erodes the normal operations of the brain.  So, it is conceivable that an 
individual would exhibit both rational and irrational behaviors fluidly.  It is, furthermore, 
conceivable that a person with a mental disease can exhibit rational behaviors and not be 
an individual with the capacity to appreciate wrongfulness. 
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The insanity defense issue is one that is complex and there is conflict between the 
professionals.  With such tension between the professionals, one could imagine the 
confusion that such technical language and complex ideas cause jurors.  This may be the 
reason that many jurors rely on their own knowledge and convictions and ignore legal 
standards.  
Poulson, Wuensch, Brown and Braithwaite (1997) cite a number of researchers 
that have identified the important role of expert testimony in juror‟s decision making.  In 
their research, they cite James (1960) who conducted a study of juror evaluation of expert 
psychiatric testimony using mock jurors.  The study revealed that 74% of mock jurors 
believed psychiatric testimony was helpful in choosing a verdict.  In a study conducted 
by Greenberg and Wursten (1988), the relative perceptions and influences of MD and 
PhD expert witnesses were assessed.  Eighty-four Introductory Psychology students 
attended experimental sessions in groups of 5-25.  They read a case, were asked to 
provide verdicts and answer questions on how they made their decisions.  In the first 
condition, subjects were exposed to PhD‟s testimony for the defense and MD‟s testimony 
for the prosecution.   In the second condition, subjects were exposed to MD‟s testimony 
for the defense and the PhD‟s for the prosecution.  The credentials for both the PhD and 
MD were approximately equal.  With the exception of specific training differences, their 
testimonies were identical.  They found bias in favor of MDs in that subjects tended to 
follow the MD‟s recommendations, endorse attitudes consistent with the MD‟s testimony 
and rate the MD as more credible.  This was primarily true in the condition where the 
PhD testified for the defense and the MD testified for the prosecution.  This finding was 
most evident among weakly involved subjects. 
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 There were two purposes for conducting the current study.  First, I 
replicated the previous research by examining whether expert witness testimony has an 
effect on juror verdict and, further, whether there is a difference between psychologist 
and psychiatrist as expert witnesses in terms of credibility.  Second, I extended previous 
research through the utilization of a sample that will, presumptively, be less weakly 
involved than the subjects involved in the previous research due to their years of 
education and age.  The current study will use graduates students, as well as, 
undergraduate students.  The assumption is that with the presumptively stronger graduate 





Ninety-four students from Rowan University, 81 undergraduate students and 13 
students, volunteered to participate in this study.  The average participant was 21.5. 
 
Design 
A 2x2 factorial design was used; participants were assigned randomly to 
conditions with the restriction that an equal number of participants participate in each 
condition.  Half of the participants read a summary of one crime and court proceedings 
and the other half read a separate crime.  Within each of these conditions half of the 
participants read a version of the of the case where they were exposed to the PhD‟s 
testimony for the defense and the MD‟s testimony for the prosecution and half were 






Participants were told that they would be participating as jurors in a jury study 
and were admonished to remember that juror decisions are extremely important and 
would affect the life of the accused if they were actually in a courtroom.  They were 
informed that they would be asked to read a case, complete a verdict slip (which also 
includes questions on how they made their decisions), and complete an Insanity Defense 
Attitude Survey. 
 Participants were asked to read the case summary, which included testimony from 
experts from both prosecution and defense.  In first condition, participants read Case A 
and were exposed to the PhD‟s testimony for the defense and the MD‟s testimony for the 
prosecution.  In the second condition, participants read Case A and were exposed to the 
MD‟s testimony or the defense and the PhD‟s testimony for the prosecution.  In the third 
condition, participants read Case B and were exposed to the PhD‟s testimony for the 
defense and the MD‟s testimony for the prosecution.  In the fourth condition, participants 
read Case B and were exposed to the MD‟s testimony or the defense and the PhD‟s 
testimony for the prosecution.  We took care to ensure that the credentials for each were 
approximately equal; specifically, both experts practiced for 15 years, both had published 
extensively, and both had graduated from Ivy League universities.  Except when the 
specific training differences were highlighted for PhD‟s and MD‟s, the testimonies were 
identical.  At the end of each case, participants were given legal definition of insanity, 
along with, a lay definition of insanity.  
 Participants completed a Verdict Slip (e.g, “Do you find that the Defendant, 
James Edward, is NOT GUILTY of the charge of criminal homicide?” “Do you find that 
Defendant, James Edward is GUILTY of the charge of criminal homicide?” “Do you find 
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that the Defendant, James Edward, is not guilty because he was legally insane at the time 
he shot and killed David Schultz or NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY?”)   
and responded to the Insanity Defense Attitude Survey (e.g., “The insanity defense is 
never an appropriate defense for the crime of first-degree murder,” “I am opposed to the 
insanity defense, but I would consider it under certain circumstances,” “In principle, I 
favor the insanity defense, but I would not consider it under certain circumstances,” “The 
insanity defense is always an appropriate defense for the crime of first-degree murder”). 
Case A 
James Edward operated a wrestling training facility on the estate.  He, also, 
provided housing on the estate to some of the wrestlers who trained at the 
facility.  Over the years, James Edward developed close relationships with some 
of the wrestlers at his facility.  He, on the other hand, came to dislike others.  In 
1995, he began to show signs of dislike toward David Schultz, a successful 
wrestler and also one of the facility‟s wrestling coaches.  On the afternoon of 
January 16, 1996, James Edward drove to the home of Mr. Schultz accompanied 
by one of the estate security consultants.  Mr. Schultz was working on his car in 
his driveway when they arrived, but greeted James Edward.  James Edward stuck 
his hand out the window, pointed a gun at Mr. Schultz and asked, “You got a 
problem with me?” He, then, shot him three times with a .44 Magnum revolver.  
He, then, pointed the weapon at the security consultant and toward Shultz‟s wife 
who was standing in the doorway of the residence.   
Soon after, James Edward fled in his vehicle to his mansion, reloaded and locked 
up his weapon.  When the police arrived, he refused to surrender to the police.   
At trial, James Edward did not dispute that he shot Mr. Schultz, but he puts forth 
a defense of insanity.  Defense witness and girlfriend of James Edward, Nancy 
White, testified about James Edwards‟ bizarre and delusional behavior in recent 
years.  She also claimed that Edward thought Schultz was part of a conspiracy 
against him. 
The defense presented Dr. Chris Hatcher, a psychologist in private practice.  Dr. 
Hatcher had an opportunity to assess James Edward and gave him a diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia.  Prosecution witness, Theodore Brown, former security 
consultant of Edward‟s, painted a portrait of James Edward as a rich and arrogant 
man who had grown increasingly angry with Schultz during the year before the 
shooting.  The prosecution contended that James Edward‟s actions after the 
shooting --retreating to his mansion and holding police sharpshooters at bay for 
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two days, refusing to surrender and asking for his lawyer more than 100 times 
during that time -- proved James Edward understood it was wrong to shoot 
Schultz (Appellee v. John DuPont, 1999). 
  
Case B 
George Thaw was the son of a software multimillionaire.  In January 1994, he 
began dating former model and actress, Mary Claire.  After only one year of 
dating, Thaw and Mary Claire married in a private ceremony in Los Angeles, 
CA.  During the time of their short courtship, Mary Claire revealed to Thaw that 
she was seduced by noted architect, Stephen White in 1991 when she was only 
sixteen years old, which made this act statutory rape.  White was forty-seven 
years old and married.  After their marriage, Thaw went into rages regarding 
White.  The Thaw and White travelled in the same social circles and have many 
common associates.   
Thaw was paranoid about the fact that White was still interested in pursuing a 
relationship with his wife.  Mary Claire would insist to Thaw that things were 
over and she had not even spoken with White in years.  Thaw became obsessed 
with White and hired detectives to follow him.  He made his wife refer to White 
only as “the Beast.”  On the evening of June 25, 1996, George Thaw shot and 
killed noted architect Stephen White during the performance of a Broadway 
musical at New York‟s Madison Square Garden.  White was unarmed and 
defenseless. 
At trial, defense witness and wife of George Thaw, Mary Claire, testified about 
Thaw‟s bizarre and delusional behavior in recent years.  The defense presented 
Dr. Alexander Smith, a psychologist in private practice.  Dr. Smith said that he 
interviewed Thaw and observed a nervous agitation and restlessness.  From the 
evidence he diagnosed the defendant as schizophrenic.  
Prosecution witness, Theodore Brown, former security consultant of Thaw of the 
painted a portrait of George Thaw as a rich and arrogant man who had grown 
increasingly angry with White during the year before the shooting. The 
prosecution presented Dr. John Davis, a clinical associate professor of psychiatry 
at Johns Hopkins University where he also received his MD.  Dr. Davis testified 
that he had an opportunity to assess George Thaw and gave him a diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia.  Dr. Davis also testified that it was his expert opinion 
that Thaw was fully aware of his actions at the time he shot White (Pinta, 2007).  






The possible range on the Verdict Slip questions for all of the questions except, 
“Which expert did you find most credible?” was 0-10, where high scores indicated higher 
levels of agreement with the particular question.  The mean scores on the Verdict Slip 
questions for the four conditions can be found in Table 1.1.   
Analysis of the question, “Which expert witness do you find most credible?” 
found preliminary analysis comparing the number of participants that answered either 
PhD (M=41) or MD (M=53) for the question, “Which expert witness did you find most 
credible?” participants-jurors indicated no significant difference.   
There was a correlation, r(92) = .298, p < .01, between participants who found the 
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity and those who reported their verdict was 
affected by expert witness testimony.    Conversely correlations show, if a participant 
found the defendant guilty, they were less likely to do so because of the expert witness 












Table 1.1 Verdict Slip Means 













Do you find that the Defendant, 
X, shot and killed X? 
10* 9.38 8.76* 9.73 
Do you find that the Defendant, 
X, is not guilty because he was 
legally insane at the time he shot 
and killed X? 
3.20 3.80 2.76 3.21 
Do you find that the Defendant, 
X, is guilty of the charge of 
criminal homicide? 
8.28 8.04 8.04 8.61 
Did expert witness testimony 
affect your verdict of guilty or 
innocent for the defendant? 
6.64 5.81 5.76 6.65 
 *  significant differences 
Results showed significant differences between groups on conditions where the 
PhD was the expert witness for the defense and the MD was expert witness for the 
prosecution (M=9.129, F(3,90) = 8.084,  p < .001 ).  There was one significant difference 
between the PhD-defense/MD-prosecution conditions on the question, “Do you find that 
the Defendant, X, shot and killed X?” F(3,90)=2.954, p=.037.  This was for both the 
Edward (M=10) Thaw and (M=8.76) cases.    There was, also, between subjects 
differences for the overall total of scores for grade levels, freshman (M=8.6, SD=.36) and 
graduate (M=9.7, SD=.40) (M=9.129, F(4) = 4.386, p = .003) on verdict slip question, 
“Do you find that the defendant, X, shot and killed David Schultz?  
Results of the “Insanity Defense Attitude Survey” showed no extremes.  Only 1 
participant felt the insanity defense was “always” an appropriate defense for criminal 
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homicide.  In addition, only 2 participants felt the insanity defense was “never” an 
appropriate defense for criminal homicide.  More than half of the participants were 
opposed the insanity defense, but would consider it under certain circumstances, n=67.  
The remainder of the participants favored the insanity defense in principle, but would not 
consider it under certain circumstances n=24.  This survey was primarily included to find 
whether or not mock jurors‟ attitudes toward the insanity defense would affect selection 
of a guilty verdict.  Pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference between those 
who felt the insanity defense was never appropriate (M=5.00, SD=5.66) and those who 
were opposed to the insanity defense, but would consider it (M=8.49, SD=2.19).    
 
Discussion 
We found there was no overall bias in favor of MD‟s.  In fact, MD‟s and PhD‟s 
were favored almost equally.  There was, however, a medical bias evident under specific 
conditions.   A medical bias was found on credibility measures in the PhD-defense/MD-
prosecution case. In this condition, the MD was consistently viewed as more expert.  In 
the MD-defense condition, however, subjects found the witnesses equally trustworthy.  It 
is unclear as to why the MD‟s were only seen as more credible in the PhD-defense/MD-
prosecution condition.  It would seem that a medical bias should have been evident 
despite the condition.  Greenberg and Wursten (1988) suggest that when testifying for the 
state, the witness is viewed as more authoritative. 
There was significance in participants‟ beliefs that expert witness testimony 
affected their verdicts.  This finding implies the importance and relevance of expert 
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witness testimony in legal proceedings.  Interestingly, expert witness testimony had the 
most effect when participants delivered NGRI verdicts.   This seems to suggest that the 
mental health profession has credibility when it comes to assisting the general public in 
understanding mental illness. 
 The absence of a medical bias may be a reflection of the generations.  The mental 
health field covers a wide range of professions. Weakening of medical biases may be due 
to generational perceptions of the mental health profession.  This absence may, also, be 
due to the field of mental health, generally, moving toward a wellness model rather than a 
medical model.   
 Results of the “Insanity Defense Attitudes Survey” showed no extreme attitudes 
about the insanity defense.  It was expected that this issue would be polarizing and that 
people would have very strong attitudes.  The opposite proved true.  It proved to be an 
issue that participants had mixed attitudes about.  This, however, was beneficial for this 
particular study because we were able to factor out extreme attitudes about the insanity 
defense as having a major effect on juror verdicts. 
 There are limitations to this study.  Insanity cases were chosen due to the idea that 
these types of cases are not as easy to decipher without specific mental health expert 
information.  Perhaps, other case types may have presented varied results.   Another 
limitation is the fact that the mental health profession is broadening.  The type of expert 
witness that may be called from the mental health profession may not be exclusive to 
psychiatrists and psychologists.  Further study could explore the perceptions and 
influence of other mental health professionals.  Some areas of the mental health 
profession are rather new, like the field of counseling.  The legal and the mental health 
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professions must be prepared to demonstrate their competence, expertise and credibility 
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James Edward resided on an 800-acre estate known as “Foxcatcher Farm.”  For many 
years James Edward operated a wrestling training facility on the estate.  He, also, 
provided housing on the estate to some of the wrestlers who trained at the facility and 
were members of “Team Foxcatcher,” which was the name of a wrestling team founded 
by James Edward.   
Over the years, James Edward developed close relationships with some of the wrestlers at 
his facility.  He, on the other hand, came to dislike others.  In 1995, he began to show 
signs of dislike toward David Schultz, a successful wrestler and also one of the facility‟s 
wrestling coaches.  On the afternoon of January 16, 1996, James Edward drove to the 
home of Mr. Schultz accompanied by one of the estate security consultants.  Mr. Schultz 
was working on his car in his driveway when they arrived, but greeted James Edward.  
James Edward stuck his hand out the window, pointed a gun at Mr. Schultz and asked, 
“You got a problem with me?” He, then, shot him three times with a .44 Magnum 
revolver.  He, then, pointed the weapon at the security consultant and toward Shultz‟s 
wife who was standing in the doorway of the residence.   
Soon after, James Edward fled in his vehicle to his mansion, reloaded and locked up his 
weapon.  When the police arrived, he refused to surrender to the police.  During the two 
day standoff which followed, James Edward spoke with his attorney on numerous 
occasions.  He was finally apprehended on January 18, 1996 when he left the mansion to 
attempt a repair of the heating system. 
People who knew James Edward noticed a change in his behavior and emotional state 
around the time of his mother‟s death in 1988.  James Edward became extremely security 
conscious and hired a security firm in 1993 to provide protection on the estate.  Despite 
the firm‟s efforts implementing extensive security measures, James Edward exhibited 
paranoid fear on several occasions that he was being spied upon and that his life was in 
danger.  Several witnesses also related incidents of James Edward‟s drug and alcohol 
abuse between 1988 and 1995.  In spite of his unusual behavior, however, James Edward 
continued to manage his facility and maintain daily operations. 
THE TRIAL 





Defense witness and girlfriend of James Edward, Nancy White, testified about James 
Edwards‟ bizarre and delusional behavior in recent years.  Nancy said that the millionaire 
had razor wire installed in the walls and attic of his house to keep intruders out, 
complained about mechanical trees moving on his property and often referred to himself 
by such titles as the Dalai Lama and Christ child. She also claimed that Edward thought 
Schultz was part of a conspiracy against him. 
The defense presented Dr. Chris Hatcher, a psychologist in private practice.  Dr. Hatcher 
is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame who also received a PhD from Harvard 
University.  He has been a practicing psychologist for 15 years.   
Dr. Hatcher had an opportunity to assess James Edward and gave him a diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia.  This evidenced by his delusional beliefs, particularly during the 
standoff and in examinations after the shooting, that he was Jesus Christ, the Dalai Lama, 
and a Russian czar, among others.   
 
Prosecution  
Prosecution witness, Theodore Brown, former security consultant of Edward‟s, painted a 
portrait of James Edward as a rich and arrogant man who had grown increasingly angry 
with Schultz during the year before the shooting. 
The prosecution contended that James Edward‟s actions after the shooting --retreating to 
his mansion and holding police sharpshooters at bay for two days, refusing to surrender 
and asking for his lawyer more than 100 times during that time -- proved James Edward 
understood it was wrong to shoot Schultz. 
 On rebuttal, Dr. Lunde testified that he had an opportunity to assess James Edward and 
gave him a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.  Dr. Lunde also testified that it was his 








George Thaw was the son of a software multimillionaire.  In January 1994, he began 
dating former model and actress, Mary Claire.  After only one year of dating, Thaw and 
Mary Claire married in a private ceremony in Los Angeles, CA.   
During the time of their short courtship, Mary Claire revealed to Thaw that she was 
seduced by noted architect, Stephen White in 1991 when she was only sixteen years old, 
which made this act statutory rape.  White was forty-seven years old and married.  After 
their marriage, Thaw went into rages regarding White.  The Thaw and White travelled in 
the same social circles and have many common associates.   
Thaw was paranoid about the fact that White was still interested in pursuing a 
relationship with his wife.  Mary Claire would insist to Thaw that things were over and 
she had not even spoken with White in years.  Thaw became obsessed with White and 
hired detectives to follow him.  He made his wife refer to White only as “the Beast.” 
On the evening of June 25, 1996, George Thaw shot and killed noted architect Stephen 
White during the performance of a Broadway musical at New York‟s Madison Square 




Defense witness and wife of George Thaw, Mary Claire, testified about Thaw‟s bizarre 
and delusional behavior in recent years.  Nancy said that the millionaire had consistently 
accused her of having secret relationship with White, despite the fact that she insisted that 
she would never have had a relationship with the man that took such advantage of her as 
a young woman.  Mary Claire testified to the fact that Thaw hired detectives to hire her, 
as well as, White.  She also claimed that Thaw thought she and White were conspiring 
against him in order to get his fortune. 
The defense presented Dr. Alexander Smith, a psychologist in private practice.  Dr. Smith 
is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame who also received a PhD from Harvard 
University.  He has been a practicing psychologist for 15 years and has published 




Dr. Smith said that she interviewed Thaw and observed a nervous agitation and 
restlessness.  From the evidence she diagnosed the defendant as schizophrenic, chronic 
undifferentiated type, characterized by abnormal thoughts, difficulty with emotional 
control, deficiency in common sense judgment, and lacking in close relationships with 
other people.   
Prosecution  
Prosecution witness, Theodore Brown, former security consultant of Thaw of the painted 
a portrait of George Thaw as a rich and arrogant man who had grown increasingly angry 
with White during the year before the shooting. 
The prosecution contended that George Thaw‟s actions after the shooting –fleeing to his 
home on the island of Barbados, making several calls to his lawyer and refusing to 
surrender before being caught by the police and extradited to the United States -- proved 
Thaw understood it was wrong to shoot White. 
The prosecution presented Dr. John Davis, a clinical associate professor of psychiatry at 
Johns Hopkins University where he also received his MD.  Dr. Lunde is a graduate of the 
University of Notre Dame.  He has been a practicing psychiatry for 15 years and has 
published extensively.  
On rebuttal, Dr. Davis testified that he had an opportunity to assess George Thaw and 
gave him a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.  Dr. Davis also testified that it was his 
expert opinion that Thaw was fully aware of his actions at the time he shot White. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
